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This book is a synthesis of recent scholarship and an attempt to summarise the complex 
military history of the early imperial period. The text does not appear to be meant as an 
authoritative statement, neutrally presenting the opinions of the various scholars in the 
field without much comment, nor is it a polemic, C.’s version of the Roman army. Rather 
C. produces a number of loosely related arguments and explanations over a whole range 
of issues, such as strategy, warfare and its conduct, Roman military expertise, the linkage 
between soldiers and the communities in which they operated, the relationship between 
soldiers and politicians, and, finally, the display of victory and the role of the military in 
Roman culture. Although touching on the more technical areas of the Roman army, C. 
remains true to his subject, war and society, rather than digressing extensively on the 
army as institution, or on the equipment or mechanics of the army. The analysis is 
careful, the text heavily annotated, the writing clear. Like other books in the series to 
which it belongs, it is a good place to start students investigating the army of the period 
and could be seen as a companion piece to C.’s collection of source material on the army 
published a decade ago.1 There may be oddities in its composition, C. works primarily 
from textual and documentary material rather from archaeology, and others would 
certainly have given the book different emphases, but it is a useful analysis of the current 
state of knowledge across a range of areas.  
                                                 
1 B. Campbell The Roman Army 31 BC – AD 337: A Sourcebook (London and New York, 
1994). 
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 C.’s synthesis reflects, as one would expect, some of the confusions and debates in the 
scholarship on the Roman army, but these confusions are often internalised rather than 
being resolved with the result that seemingly contradictory statements catch the eye. For 
instance, the Roman army is described as a ‘total institution’ (p. 45), providing the 
complete social environment for the soldiery, but while soldiers in Britain lived a life of 
isolation from the surrounding society, in other provinces there were ‘opportunities for a 
considerable degree of integration’ as ‘soldiers lived and worked side by side with the 
local population’ (p. 99 – 100). C. denies that soldiers ‘made a substantial impact on the 
development of local communities’ (p. 104), concluding that any affect the soldiers had 
would have been ‘limited, indirect, and largely accidental’ as the veterans brought with 
them ‘some vague idea of Roman values’ (p. 104). Yet, ‘the army also brought with it a 
range of activities and facilities associated with a settled urban environment: piped water-
supply, baths, amphitheatres, hospitals, and other carefully planned buildings… Such 
buildings would be for the troops’ own benefit, but there is evidence that they contributed 
expertise and muscle to local projects’ (p. 95): the very stuff of Roman civilization, at 
least of we follow Tacitus’ Agricola. Any historian grappling with these problems will 
inevitably discover that the relationship between soldiers and society was multifaceted, 
and the dogmatism with which this issue was once discussed is sensibly avoided here. 
Nevertheless, C. neither emphasises the incoherence of that relationship, which is in itself 




Similar tensions mark C.’s discussion of strategy. C. notes that there is very little in the 
way of political justification for Roman military activity in the source material, but still 
suggests that Roman policy was generally defensive. Nevertheless, C. argues that 
Trajanic expansion was essentially for glory, and find little justification for the military 
adventurism of Augustus, though, puzzlingly, C. accepts the traditional denigration of 
Augustus’ military activity, claiming that he was no a warrior. Roman strategic policy is 
strangely ambivalent, with authors proclaiming that Rome was due empire without end at 
more at less the moment when others appear to be shoring up defences and proclaiming 
an end to expansion. Again, C. does not resolve this problem, nor focus on it so that the 
reader can be made aware of the contradictions in Roman policy. 
 
C. represents the imperial army as an Augustan creation, reflecting the general 
impression that we receive from our sources of fundamental change in the early imperial 
period but many of our sources share our benefit of considerable hindsight. The adoption 
of the Augustan period as a starting point reflects a common and convenient caesura in 
historiography generated by the political change. By starting in 30 BC, C. underplays 
continuities with the Republic, perhaps especially important in the relationship between 
the army and society. The emphases on a rural soldiery, the political benefits of gloria 
and (relatively) unrestrained imperialism were, it could be argued, features of both 
Republican and imperial armies. Similarly, he common tendency to compress the 
evolution of the imperial army into the Augustan period is not resisted, though the 
institutional framework of the army continued to evolve throughout the Julio-Claudian 
period at least. Similarly, C. suggests a relatively clear break at the end of the period, 
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suggesting that the age of the imperial army was over by 284. Historians have to stop 
somewhere and 284 is as good or bad a date as many others and the army of the fourth 
century appears rather different from that of the first in institutional form. Yet, like most 
other social institutions, the army was in a more or less continuous state of evolution 
throughout this period and many of the same issues of negotiation between local elites 
and the military figure in the informative mid-fourth-century literary and documentary 
sources.  
 
C.’s task in this book is unenviable. So many of the issues central to his theme are 
unsettled in contemporary historiography in ways in which they were not even twenty 
years ago, and C. gives an impression of a subject in some flux. C. does not cut through 
these difficulties to offer new interpretations, but that is not his intention. This book sets 
out to do a job, and does this effectively, offering students and the general reader a 
plausible, readable interpretation of the Roman army and society. The book might have 
been enhanced if the contradictions and difficulties that face those studying these issues 
were more fully exposed. 
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